Never even in Latin American history has the media been so directly involved in a political coup. Venezuela's 'hate media' controls 95% of the airwaves and has a near-monopoly over newsprint, and it played a major part in the failed attempt to overthrow the president, Hugo Chávez, in April. Although tensions in the country could easily spill into civil war, the media is still directly encouraging dissident elements to overthrow the democratically elected president - if necessary by force.
"We
had a deadly weapon: the media. And now that I have the opportunity, let me
congratulate you." In Caracas, on 11 April 2002, just a few hours before
the temporary overthrow of Venezuela's president, Hugo Chávez, Vice-Admiral
Victor Ramírez Pérez congratulated journalist Ibéyiste Pacheco live on
Venevision television. Twenty minutes earlier, when Pacheco had begun to
interview a group of rebel officers, she could not resist admitting,
conspiratorially, that she had long had a special relationship with them.
At
the same time, in a live interview from Madrid, another journalist, Patricia
Poleo, also seemed well informed about the likely future development of
"spontaneous events". She announced on the Spanish channel TVE:
"I believe the next president is going to be Pedro Carmona." Chávez,
holed up in the presidential palace, was still refusing to step down.
After
Chávez came to power in 1998, the five main privately owned channels - Venevisión,
Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV), Globovisión and CMT - and nine of the 10
major national newspapers, including El Universal, El Nacional, Tal Cual, El
Impulso, El Nuevo País, and El Mundo, have taken over the role of the
traditional political parties, which were damaged by the president's electoral
victories. Their monopoly on information has put them in a strong position. They
give the opposition support, only rarely reporting government statements and
never mentioning its large majority, despite that majority's confirmation at the
ballot box. They have always described the working class districts as a red zone
inhabited by dangerous classes of ignorant people and delinquents. No doubt
considering them unphotogenic, they ignore working class leaders and
organisations.
Their
investigations, interviews and commentaries all pursue the same objective: to
undermine the legitimacy of the government and to destroy the president's
popular support. "In aesthetic terms, this revolutionary government is a
cesspit," was the delicate phrase used by the evening paper Tal Cual. Its
editor, Teodoro Petkoff, is a keen opponent of Chávez. Petkoff is a former
Marxist guerrilla who became a neo-liberal and a pro-privatisation minister in
the government of rightwing president Rafael Caldera. The Chávez government is
not, of course, above criticism. It makes mistakes, and the civilian and
military personnel who surround it are tainted by corruption. But the government
was democratically elected and still has the backing of the majority. It can
also be credited with successes, nationally and internationally.
When
it comes to discrediting Chávez, anything goes. There was a scandal in Caracas
in March when a faked interview with Ignacio Ramonet, the director of Le Monde
diplomatique, was circulated. In a statement alleged to have been made to
Emiliano Payares Gúzman, a Mexican researcher at Princeton University, Ramonet
was supposed to have said: "Chávez lacks a respectable intellectual
corpus, and that is why his ship is always off course. When he won the
elections, it seemed to me that he had something about him. But populism won
out, as so often happens in such cases. I have seen videos in which he sings
boleros while setting out his economic program, if indeed he has one. I think
those true and verifiable facts speak for themselves, I don't need to voice my
opinion of somebody like that."
Venezuela
Analítica (1) immediately posted the "statement" on
the web, without checking on its authenticity, and it then became headline news
in El Nacional. The paper was delighted to give credence to the idea of Chávez
being isolated internationally, and made no attempt to check with the supposed
interviewee. When Ramonet denied having made the statement, El Nacional rounded
on the hoaxer (2) and, less overtly, without even apologising,
on Ramonet.
The
"information" that has been published has verged on the surreal. For
example, "sources from the intelligence services have uncovered agreements
entered into with elements linked to Hezbollah on the Venezuelan island of
Margarita, who are controlled by the Iranian embassy. You will remember that
when Chávez was campaigning, a certain Moukhdad was extremely generous. That
debt had to be repaid, and now Iran is to make Venezuela an operational base, in
exchange for training Venezuelans in Iranian organisations for the defence of
the Islamic Revolution. Terrorism is in our midst" (3).
On
21 March El Nacional ran the headline: "Hugo Chávez admits to being the
head of a criminal network." Next day Tal Cual referred to "the
feeling of nausea provoked by the aggressive words he uses to try to frighten
Venezuelans". The president was insulted, compared with Idi Amin, Mussolini
or Hitler, called a fascist, dictator or tyrant, and subjected to a spate of
attacks. In any other country actions would have been brought for libel.
"An ongoing and disrespectful attack," was how the minister of trade,
Adina Bastidas, put it. "They accuse me of funding the planting of bombs in
the streets. And I cannot defend myself. If you attack them, they complain to
the United States!"
Chávez
responded to this media bombardment, sometimes using strong language, especially
during his weekly broadcast Aló presidente! on the only state-controlled
television channel. But his regime in no way resembles a dictatorship, and his
diatribes have not been followed by measures to control the flow of information.
Since Chávez took office, not a single journalist has been imprisoned, and the
government has not shut down any media. Yet it is accused of "flouting
freedom of information" and of "attacking social communicators".
On
7 January a group of the president's supporters besieged the offices of El
Nacional chanting hostile slogans. Shouting "tell the truth!", they
hurled objects at the building. The number of attacks on journalists is
increasing, according to Carlos Correa, general coordinator of Provea (4),
an organisation for the defence of human rights, and they are being criminalised.
"Although there have been no deaths, the situation is serious. Since the
media bosses decided to oppose Chávez politically, it is no longer possible to
have a reasonable discussion about the country's problems. But to claim there is
no freedom of expression is outrageous."
"You
read the newspapers, you watch the TV news and you have the impression that the
country is gripped by conflict," says Jesuit Father Francisco José
Virtuoso sadly. "Naturally that all adds to the tension." The popular
majority is striking back in this war in which it is the target, no longer
prepared to tolerate journalists who consider themselves above the law or the
anti-democratic control of information.
Incidents
are on the increase. The official agency Venpres described three media
personalities as "narcojournalists"; the journalists in question - Ibéyise
Pacheco (editor of Así es la noticia, a member of the El Nacional group),
Patricia Poleo and television presenter José Domingo Blanco (Globovisión) -
decided to make capital out of the accusations. After condemning their
"persecution" in front of the cameras at the US embassy, they left for
Washington, where they got a heroic welcome. The Venpres article, signed by a J
Valeverde (5), was repudiated by President Chávez and
condemned by the defence minister, José Vicente Rangel; it led to the censure
and resignation of the director of Venpres, Oscar Navas. But that did not halt a
campaign, in Venezuela and abroad, against a government accused of
"muzzling the media".
The
media has proved adept at using the self-fulfilling prophecy - both in relation
to government supporters and the government. By protesting about infringements
of liberty, when under no threat, and using lies and manipulation, the media
provoked a reaction, sometimes inciting its victims to do wrong. Those misdeeds
were then portrayed as the cause (and not the consequence) of the media's
unhappy relationship with the government and much of the population.
We
must condemn the attacks by the president's supporters on television units or
journalists. But how could those supporters tolerate always being described as
"Taliban" or as "villains"? We should protest when
journalists, even if they are aggressive and completely identified with the
oligarchy, are described as "narco-journalists". But those journalists
had themselves bombarded the president with false accusations and portrayed him
as the accomplice of Colombian "narco-guerrillas".
Led
by men of influence and top journalists, the media is taking over from other
players in the process of destabilisation: Pedro Carmona's employers'
association (Fedecámaras), Carlos Ortega's Confederation of Venezuelan Workers,
dissident members of the military, the technocrats of the national oil company (PDVSA)
and a few discreet US officials (6). United in the Venezuelan
Press Bloc (BPV), the media finally showed its hand when it joined in the first
general strike on 10 December 2001.
"Free"
opinions published in print -"Time for a change of government" or
"Time to overthrow this government" (7) - were
reinforced by dubious manipulation of the broadcast media. On 5 April two TV
presenters gave their own commentary on a strike of petrol stations that was
linked to the PDVSA conflict: "Have you remembered to fill up? Hurry,
because tomorrow there won't be a drop left in the country." By encouraging
motorists to rush out to buy petrol, they provoked unnecessary chaos, though the
strike was only partial and the stations were still receiving supplies.
On
7 April Ortega and Carmona announced that there was to be a general strike. The
editor of El Nacional, Miguel Enrique Otero, stood shoulder to shoulder with
them and spoke on behalf of the press: "We are all involved in this
struggle in defence of the right to information." Two days later the BPV,
which had just been visited by the new US ambassador, Charles Shapiro, decided
to back the strike. From then on the television companies broadcast live from
the headquarters of the PDVSA-Chuao, the designated assembly point for
opposition demonstrations.
"Take
to the streets" thundered El Nacional on 10 April (in an unattributed
editorial). "Ni un paso atrás! (not one step backwards)" responded
the hoardings on Globovisión. Another TV company broadcast: "Venezuelans,
take to the streets on Thursday 11 April at 10am. Bring your flags. For freedom
and democracy. Venezuela will not surrender. No one will defeat us." The
call to overthrow the head of state became so obvious that the government
applied Article 192 of the telecommunications law. More than 30 times -for all
television and radio channels - it requisitioned 15-20 minutes' air time to
broadcast its views. But the broadcasters divided the screen in two and
continued to urge rebellion.
On
11 April military and civilian press conferences calling for the president's
resignation marked the next phase. On RCTV, Ortega called on the opposition to
march on Miraflores (the presidential palace). At about 4pm, when the scale of
the conspiracy was apparent, the authorities gave the order to block the
frequencies used by the private channels. Globovisión, CMT and Televen went off
air for a few moments before resuming their broadcasts using satellite or cable.
All screens broadcast an image that had been edited to show armed
counter-demonstrators firing on "the crowd of peaceful demonstrators".
As a result the Bolivarian Circles, the social organisation of Chávez
supporters, were blamed for deaths and injuries (8).
The
conspirators, including Carmona, met at the offices of Venevisión. They stayed
until 2am to prepare "the next stage", along with Rafael Poleo (owner
of El Nuevo Pais) and Gustavo Cisneros, a key figure in the coup. Cisneros, a
multimillionaire of Cuban origin and the owner of Venevisión, runs a media
empire - Organización Diego Cisneros. It has 70 outlets in 39 countries (9).
Cisneros is a friend of George Bush senior: they play golf together and in 2001
the former US president holidayed in Cisneros's Venezuelan property. Both are
keen on the privatisation of the PDVSA (10). Otto Reich, US
assistant secretary of state for Interamerican affairs, admits to having spoken
with Cisneros that night (11).
At
4am on 12 April, to avoid bloodshed, Chávez allowed himself to be arrested and
taken to the distant island of Orchila. Without presenting any document signed
by Chávez to confirm the news, the media chorused his "resignation".
The boss of the bosses, Carmona, proclaimed himself president and dissolved all
of the constituent, legitimate and democratic bodies. Venezolana de Televisión,
the only means of communication available to the government, was the first
broadcaster forced to shut down when Carmona took power (12).
The
press greeted the coup (though they censored any use of that word) with
undisguised enthusiasm. And for good reason. Interviewing Admiral Carlos Molina
Tamayo and Victor Manuel García, director of statistical institute Ceca, at
6.45am, presenter Napoleón Bravo boasted that he had allowed his own house to
be used to record a call to rebellion by General González González. García
described his role at the dissident military centre of operations at Fort Tiuna:
"We were short of communications facilities, and I have to thank the press
for their solidarity and cooperation in helping us to establish communications
with the outside world and pass on the instructions that General González González
gave me."
"One
step forward" was the triumphant headline in El Universal. Journalist
Rafael Poleo, who had filed the account of the first meeting of the rebel
leaders, took responsibility (with others) for the document setting up the new
government. During the afternoon "President" Carmona offered Poleo's
daughter, Patricia, the post of head of the central information bureau. The
decree establishing a dictatorship was countersigned by the employers, the
church and the representatives of a pseudo "civil society", and also
by Miguel Angel Martínez, on behalf of the media. Daniel Romero, private
secretary of the former social-democrat president Carlos Andrés Pérez, and an
employee of the Cisneros group, read it out.
The
desire for revenge provoked repression. The interior minister, Ramón Rodríguez
Chacín, and a member of parliament, Tarek William Saab, were arrested, and
heckled and manhandled by a crowd. RCTV triggered a manhunt by publishing a list
of the most wanted individuals and broadcast violent searches live, aping the
hectic pace of US news broadcasts. The live broadcast on all channels of
attorney general Isias Rodríguez's press conference was suddenly taken off air
after only five minutes when he talked about the excesses of the
"provisional government" and condemned the "coup".
On
13 April the Chávez supporters were unleashed, and officers loyal to him retook
control. But the only way Venezuelans could get information was through CNN
broadcasts in Spanish - available only on cable, or on the internet sites of the
Madrid daily El País and the BBC in London. Announcing the rebellion by the
42nd parachute division in Maracay, CNN expressed amazement that the press were
saying nothing. The freedom of information that had been clamoured for had been
replaced by silence. Screens were filled with action films, cookery programs,
cartoons and baseball games from the major US leagues, interspersed only with
repeats of General Lucas Rincón's announcement of the "resignation"
of Chávez.
Thousands
logged on to the internet and got on their mobile phones, but only the
alternative press was able to beat the blackout. Popular newspapers, television
and radio began life in the poor districts, and were an important source of
communication and information. Short on experience, they were the first targets
of the "democratic transition". According to Thierry Deronne, the
presenter of Teletambores, Chávez had never asked them to broadcast his
speeches.
But
the anti-Chávez powers did not hesitate long after their coup before arresting
editorial staff and seizing equipment, ensuring that the only way the people
could find out what was really happening was via the opposition press. In
Caracas, Radio Perola, TV Caricuao, Radio Catia Libre and Catia TV were searched
and personnel subjected to violence and detention.
In
the late afternoon of 13 April, crowds gathered in front of RCTV (then Venevisión,
Globovisión, Televen and CMT, as well as the offices of El Universal and El
Nacional), throwing stones and compelling journalists to broadcast a message
calling for "their" president to be restored. It was an intolerable
attack on the press; terrified journalists broadcast an appeal for help on air -
conveniently forgetting that they were supposed to be on the rebel side.
"We too are part of the people; we too are Venezuelans and we are doing our
duty. It is not possible that the supporters of Lieutenant Colonel Hugo Chávez
[no mention that he was head of state] should consider us their enemies."
It
was 20 hours before the state channel Venezolana de Televisión came back on the
air with the help of militants from the community media and from soldiers from
the presidential guard. The silence was broken and Venezuelans then found out
that the situation was changing. Except for Ultimas Noticias, no newspaper was
published next day to announce the president's return. The private television
channels broadcast no bulletins. Globovisión alone rebroadcast the information
that had been transmitted by the international agencies (13).
Although
the restoration of democratic normality did not result in media repression, the
media continues play victim. It gives priority to the "coup heroes",
speaks of a "power vacuum" and calls for the resignation of Chávez -
described as a "murderer". Openly called the "hate media",
it claims to be the "coup media".
Seze
on www.analitica.com.
Gúzman
claimed to have done it to show just how unreliable the Venezuelan press
was.
Programa
Venezolano de Educación-Acción en derechos humanos.
It
was later discovered that this was the pseudonym of an unsavoury character
called Rafael Kries.
See
"Venezuela: a coup countered", Le Monde diplomatique English
edition, May 2002.
See
Le Monde diplomatique, English edition, May 2002, and the photographs posted
on our website.
Including:
Univisión (80% of broadcasts in Spanish in the United States), Canal 13,
Chilevisión, DirectTV Latin America, Galavisión, Playboy TV Latin America,
Playboy TV International, Uniseries, Vale TV, Via Digital, AOL Latin
America.
The
former would like to see it in the hands of a US company close to his
interests, and the latter has his eye on Citgo, the American subsidiary of
PDVSA.
The
same applies to Radio Nacional de Venezuela and the official news agency
Venpres.
Some
journalists have resigned in disgust, like André Izarra, of RCTV where the
management has imposed a ban on pro-Chávez reporting.
Translated
by Julie Stoker
ALL RIGHTS RESERVED © 1997-2002 Le Monde diplomatique
The situation of the news media is also of concern. Far from providing fair and accurate reporting, the media by and large seek to provoke popular discontent and outrage in support of the hard-line opposition.
"Venezuela's Political Crisis," Human Rights Watch, October 9, 2002